Nakamura establishes a theorem which gives necessary conditions for a simple game with ordinal preferences to have a nonempty core. The conditions are also sufficient, if the set of alternative outcomes is finite. In the present paper, we will show that Nakamura's method of the proof of this theorem makes it possible to generalize the theorem to an arbitrary characteristic function game with ordinal preferences.
Introduction
Nakamura [5] establishes a theorem which gives necessary conditions for a simple game with ordinal preferences to have a nonempty core. The conditions are also sufficient, if the set of alternative outcomes is finite. The theorem has already been successfully applied te social choice theory by Nakamura [6] , [7] , [8] , and Ishikawa and Nakamura [3] . Also, by using the theorem, Pe1(~g [10] has developed a new direction of the study connecting social choice theory to game theory.
In the present paper we generalize the theorem to an arbitrary chara.::teristic function game with ordinal preferences. Rather surprisingly, this generalization will be carried out almost straightforwardly by modifying the proof of the theorem. The result, however, may be expected to have new applications, since the coneept of a characteristic function game is clearly much more general than that of a simple game. Moreover it might also be expected to shed new . . light on general existence problem of a core of a cooperative game without sidepayments. Therefore it will be worchwhile to demonstrate the generalization.
Throughout the paper, the cardinal number of a set A is deno ted by p (A) and the symbol of negation by 'V. We also explicitly assume the axiom of well-ordering. Following an analog to Aumann and Peleg [1] (See also Peleg [9] ) or to Bloomfield [2] , we define a characteristic function game with ordinal preferences (or, simply, a characteristic function game).
A characteristic function game (with ordinal preferences) is a triple (N, ri, v), where v is a mapping from 2N into 2r1 such that
Let X E: rI. A coalition S is said to be effective for x. if X E: v(S). We denote by E(x) the set of the effective coalitions for x. By (1.2), N is effective for all x E: ri, and so N E: E(x) for all x E: rI. Hence note that E(x) is always nonempty.
Let G = (N, ri, v) be a characteristic function game. Let pN E: DN and let x, y E: rI with x + y. We say that x dominates y with respect to pN, denoted by x dom(pN) y, i f there is an S C N such that x E: v(S) and x :pi y for all i E: S. Then the core for the game G with respect to pN is defined by C(G,pN) = {x E: rll 'V Y dom(pN) x for all y E: rI}.
(Our definition of a core is the direct extension of that in Nakamura [4] .)
A Main Theorem
Let G = (N, ri, v) be a characteristic function game. For each x I~ ri, we choose Sex) E: E(x). If, for every selection of these sets {sex)} n'
Core of a Characteristic Function Game 227 theorem in Nakamura [5] (Theorem 3.1 in Bection 3 of the present paper). But for the sake 0 E completeness, we should s ta te the proof, and moreover this proof is somewhat simpler than that in Nakamura [5] . Proof. Suppose G does not satisfy CIP. Then there is a selection {Sex)} n xE"
such that (In Sex) = r/J. Let (n, ~) be a well-ordered set with respect to a xE" linear order~. We shall define a prefe:rence relation pi of each player i.
Let i E N. Then there is an X E n such that i t Sex). We arbitrarily fix such an x and denote it by xi. We define n(xi) = {XEnjX<X i }. By defining the following lexicographical direct sum:
we have another well-ordered set i (n, ~ ). For any x, YEn, we define
Here note that x pi xi for all x E n with x f xi. pi is clearly a linear order on n. Then we can define a profile pN. Now we shall show that C(G,pN) r/J. Let x E n. We need to consider two cases.
Suppose first that x is not a maximal element of (n, ~). Then there is ayE n which is immediately after x with respect to~. For each i E S(y),
Hence it is easy to see that y P x. Since S(y) E E(y), Y dom(P ) x.
Suppose next that x is a maximal element of (n, ~). Let X o be the minimtml element of (n, ~). (i=l, .. ,p). Clearly (l Sex) = r/J, which is a contradlc-
XEn
In the next section we will derive the corresponding theorem in Nakamura [5] from theorem 2.1. (N, ~,w) . (Our definition of a simple game is also the same as that in Nakamura [4] and [5] .)
Let G = (N, ~, w) be a simple game. G is weak, if
A member of VG is called a veto player in G.
Let G = (N, ~, w) be a simple game without veto players. Then we define
L is nonempty and partitioned into the nonempty classes of numerically equivalent subsets of L The set of equivalence classes is the set of distinct cardinal numbers of a in L, and we denote it by L. Since L is a well-ordered p p set by its natural linear order. Then we define the following cardinal number:
finite, then the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
In order to prove theorem 3.1, we show that, for a simple game, CIP condition is the same as the following conditions:
Proof. Let G = (N, ~, w) be a simple game. Suppose the above conditions are satisfied. If there is a selection {sex)} ~,S(x)E:W, such that n Sex) = i/J, Hence CIP condition is equivalent to the above conditions for a simple game. Hence theorem 3.1 follows from theorem 2.1 immediately.
Symmetric Games 229
In this section we characterize CIP condition for a mono tonic symmetric characteristic function game, and we derive a theorem by Po1ishchuk [11] .
Let G = (N, g, v) be a characteristic function game. G is monotonic, if
SeT v(S) c v(T).
G is symmetric, if
Lemma 4.1. Let G = (N, g, v) be a monotonic characteristic function game.
G is symmetric. iff there exis ts a function h from n into the set of cardinal numbers p with 0 < p ~ peg), such that E(x) = {ScN I peS) 2:,h(x)} for all x € g.
Proof. Sufficiency is trivial. Then we show necessity.
set of distinct cardinal numbers of the elements in E(x).
Let E(x) be the p Since E(x) is a p well-ordered set by its natural linear order, there exis ts the minimum cardinal number with respect to this orc:er. Then we define:
. Conversely suppose S c: N and peS) ~ h(x). There is a T € E(x) with hex) = p(T). Since peS) ~ p(T), there is a one to one mapping 1jJ from T into S; and so p (1jJ (T» = peT) and lp (T) cS. Since v is synnnetric and monotonie, veT) c v(S). By x € v(T). x € '.1(S) ;
i.e., S € E(x). Q.E.D.
From theorem 2.1, the following theorem is easily verified by examining CIP condition. Theorem 4.2.
(Polishchuk [11] ). Let Nand g be finite, and let peN) n.
Let G = (N, rl, v) be a monotonic symmetric game and let h be a function determined by lemma 4.1. Then C(G,p N ) f ~ for all pN E DN iff = [n -h(x)] < n.
xErl Remark 4.1. If one develops our discussion with a weak ordering preference relation or a linear ordering preference relation, instead of an acycLic preference relation pi, then our theorems in this paper are also true.
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